Can State's Attorney Prosecutors Be Held Liable For Wrongful Convictions?

Posted on September 28, 2009 by Avi Kamionski
According to an article published today on reason.com - "its still an open question." They explain:
In November, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on Pottawattamie v. McGhee in order to resolve it. The facts of the case aren't in dispute. In 1978, a retired Iowa police captain was killed by a shotgun blast while working as a private security guard. Prosecutors Joseph Hrvol and David Richter then worked with local police to manufacture evidence against the two chief suspects, Terry Harrington and Curtis McGhee, Jr. The two men were convicted of the murder in separate trials, and each was sentenced to life without parole. The Iowa Supreme Court set aside both convictions in 2003, citing exculpatory evidence pointing to another suspect that was withheld from defense counsel in both trials. Both men were eventually released from prison. Seeking damages for losing 25 years of their lives, they brought a civil rights suit against the police, prosecutors, and county that convicted them.
[Currently prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity, but , t]he Court has put one small dent in the absolute immunity shield enjoyed by prosecutors. In the 1993 case Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, it ruled that prosecutors who act as investigators in a case are subject to the more limited qualified immunity afforded to police officers with respect to the actions they take as investigators. Qualified immunity is still a high hurdle; it doesn't exactly open prosecutors up to a barrage of lawsuits. A claimant must show that a state actor violated his "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights," as those rights are understood by a "reasonable person" (as distinguished from a legal professional). Under Buckley, prosecutors who violate the clear constitutional rights of a defendant while serving an investigatory role can be sued, but once they assume the role of a prosecutor, they're immune.
So should prosecutors be able to skirt wrongful conviction lawsuits based on immunity? Should the police be left to hold the bag alone? Prosecutors will tell you they rely on information given to them by the officers when they prosecute their cases - and that they have no role in investigating the case. But is that really the case? Prosecutors clearly want to get convictions and take full control of a case after it is approved for felony charges (if not earlier). They actually spend more time with the case then do the officers. We are not advocating suing anyone - we are just highlighting that is not fair to simply accuse the police in wrongful conviction lawsuits. They take their guidance from the state's attorneys. The only difference between them and the police - absolute immunity. State's attorneys have it and police do not.
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Seventh Circuit Rules Detective Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Posted on August 21, 2008 by Andy Hale

Wheeler v. Lawson

Today the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion in Wheeler v. Lawson (attached), affirming the district court's granting of summary judgement in a false arrest case.

 

Plaintiff had a detached garage on her property. After an explosion in the garage, the police found "a furnace, two propane tanks that were ruptured, thirty cans of starter fluid and lithium batteries that had been broken apart. Someone had used a can-opener to open the bottom of the starter fluid cans. Police also found a clear plastic bag with a powdery substance that later was determined to be methamphetamine; autopsy tests of someone who was in the garage "revealed the presence of methamphetamine in his system". "Detective Lawson noticed that the valves of the propane tanks had been altered, and, based on his prior experience, Detective Lawson knew that these tanks and the type of connection on them often are used in metham-
phetamine labs.

Detective Lawson had only two brief talks with the plaintiff immediately before and immediately after the fire was extinguished. During these short conversations, plaintiff told the Detective that she did not know the cause of the fire, that she was not aware that [someone] had been inside the garage and that she was not aware of any methamphetamine production taking place on her property.

About two weeks later, on June 22, Detective Lawson arrested her on the charge of maintaining a common nuisance. The charges were later dropped and plaintiff brought suit.

The Seventh Circuit ruled that there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff for maintaining a common nuisance.

The court explained that defendant could not show that plaintiff had constructive possession of the contraband.

One way defendant attempted to show constructive possession was through information learned in discovery, but the Seventh Circuit dismissed this information because "[a]ny evidence . . . that came to light after the arrest,” we have explained, “is not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.” Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir. 1994). Before the district court and on appeal, Detective Lawson asserts that Ms. Wheeler stored numerous personal items, including bicycles, a lawnmower, patio equipment and clothing, inside the garage and that she used the garage about once a week. In support of this factual assertion, however, Detective Lawson relies only upon Ms. Wheeler’s deposition that was taken for purposes of this case. Critically, nothing in Detective Lawson’s deposition or in the reports that were created in the course of the investigation indicates that, at the time that he arrested Ms. Wheeler, he knew that she kept personal items in the garage or that she used the garage once a week. This absence of evidence thus eliminates one of the corroborating circumstances upon which Detective Lawson relies.


Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit found that the detective was shielded by qualified immunity

The Court explained:

"These circumstances provided a reasonable, although ultimately mistaken, basis for Officer Lawson to believe that Ms. Wheeler was aware of the activities taking place in the garage. Although Detective Lawson could have conducted a more thorough investigation under the circumstances, given the information that he knew and given that the burden is on Ms. Wheeler to defeat his qualified immunity defense, we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer could not have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler for maintaining a common nuisance."

 

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Seventh Circuit Rejects Qualified Immunity Defense In Towing Incident

Posted on August 20, 2007 by Andy Hale
Plaintiffs Ryan Belcher and Daraina Gleason filed suit against the town of Orland, Indiana and Deputy Marshall Vaughn Norton after their vehicle was towed and they were arrested after attempting to remove a radio from the vehicle at the impoundment lot. Defendant Vaughn argued that even if he violated plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, he was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit stated that the doctrine of qualified immunity  "can shield a public official such as Deputy Marshall Norton from civil liability if he can demonstrate that he was performing a discretionary function and that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have believed that, at the time he acted, his actions were within the bounds of the law," citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The court further stated that "qualified immunity protects an official from suit and from liability for civil damages when, at the time of the challenged action, the contours of the constitutional right were not so defined as to put the official on notice that his conduct violated the Constitutions," citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). The Seventh Circuit held that the qualified immunity defense was not available to Deputy Marshall Norton because a reasonable police officer acting at the time would have known that he lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for criminal conversion since Indiana's lien statute gave the towing company a lien on the vehicle but not its contents. The case was decided on August 15, 2007 and bears case number 06-3174.
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Seventh Circuit Reiterates That Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Information Extends To Post-Conviction Proceedings

Posted on August 8, 2007 by Andy Hale
In a case styled Gordon Steidl vs. Steven Fermon, Diane Carper, Charles Brueggeman, et al., the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants' qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff Gordon Steidl spent 17 years in prison for a double homicide in Paris, Illinois that he alleges he did not commit. Steidl was released from prison in 2004 after a federal district court granted his petition for habeas corpus. After his release, Steidl brought a civil rights lawsuit against Fermon, Carper, Brueggeman, who were Illinois State police officers, and others. These defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense arguing, in part, that the obligations to disclose under Brady do not extend beyond the original trial. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating: "In our view, Brady, Ritchie, and the other cases in this line impose on the state an ongoing duty to disclose exculpatory information if, as Brady put it, that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment and available for the trial. . . For evidence known to the state at the time of the trial, the duty to disclose extends throughout the legal proceedings that may affect either guilt or punishment, including post-conviction proceedings."
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Detective Wins Summary Judgment Based On Qualified Immunity

Posted on April 6, 2007 by Andy Hale
Judge Robert Miller, United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, ruled that detective Ronald Lawson is entitled to qualified immunity from liability as to plaintiff Michelle Wheeler's claim under the Fourth Amendment alleging an unreasonable search and seizure. The court stated "Detective Lawson investigated the fire at Ms. Wheeler's garage and found evidence of a methamphetamine lab, a quantity of methamphetamine, and a surveillance camera focused on the garage that could be monitored from inside Ms. Wheeler's house. Based on the totality of the circumstances then known to Detective Lawson and reasonable inferences drawn from those circumstances, Detective Lawson had probable cause to believe criminal activity had occurred on Ms. Wheeler's property and probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler for maintaining a common nuisance under Ind. Code 35-48-4-13." The full opinion can be found at 2007 WL 844870.
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Seventh Circuit Affirms Denial Of Summary Judgment On Qualified Immunity Claim

Posted on April 5, 2007 by Andy Hale
In a March 27,2007 opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment brought by City of Fort Wayne police officers based on qualified immunity. The court noted that "Governmental actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity and are 'shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The court noted that "typically, cases in which we have affirmed the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to police officers involve arrests in which a witness, most commonly the putative victim, provides sufficient support to justify the officer's decision." The court noted that "in the present case, there are no witnesses offering testimony to support the officers' version of the Washingtons' arrests. Both Clara Washington and Leon Washington deny any physical altercation which would qualify as domestic battery under Indiana law, and they claim that they told the officers they were simply play-fighting." The court also stated that "however implausible the Washingtons' account might seem, it is not our place to decide who is telling the truth. Where the parties present two vastly different stories - as they do here - it is almost certain that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute."
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Seventh Circuit Clarifies Timing Of Qualified Immunity Appeals

Posted on March 21, 2007 by Andy Hale
In a case styled Fairley, et al. v. Fermaint, et al., No. 06-24, and in an opinion handed down on March 19, 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "in accord with Behrens and Toeller, that a public official may appeal from an order conclusively denying a motion (based on qualified immunity) seeking summary judgment, whether or not the official has appealed from an order denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, and whether or not the for summary judgment rests on new legal or factual arguments. But once a conclusive resolution has been reached at either stage, a renewed motion for the same relief, or a belated request for reconsideration, does not reopen the time for appeal." In that case, two former guards at Cook County Jail filed a Section 1983 action alleging some of their ex-colleagues violated the First Amendment for vilifying and assaulting them because they stood up for inmate's rights. The plaintiffs had filed an interlocutory appeal after their motion for summary judgment was denied, but had not previously filed an interlocutory appeal after their motion to dismiss was denied.  Finally, the court reiterated that "an interlocutory appeal is not the forum for resolving disputes about whether defendants did what plaintiffs accuse them of."
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Seventh Circuit Affirms Granting Of Summary Judgment And Striking Of Expert Report

Posted on February 15, 2007 by Andy Hale
In Mannoia v. Farrow, an arrestee sued a police detective under Section 1983 and state tort law alleging the detective violated his Fourth Amendment rights by intentionally misrepresenting facts to the judge who issued an arrest warrant. District Court Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and, in doing so, struck the report of plaintiff's police procedures expert for failing to comply with Rule 26(a)(2). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had not shown that the detective acted deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth or made misrepresentations to the issuing judge that were necessary to the probable cause determination. The court further held that "[b]ecause plaintiff cannot establish that [the detective] violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we conclude [the detective] is protected from suit by the defense of qualified immunity. The court further found it was proper to strike the expert report for failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2). This opinion is available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 397497.
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